Abstract. Structure-preserving cryptography is a world where messages, signatures, ciphertexts and public keys are entirely made of elements of a group over which a bilinear map is efficiently computable. While structure-preserving signatures have received much attention the last 6 years, structure-preserving encryption schemes have undergone slower development. In particular, the best known structure-preserving cryptosystems with chosen-ciphertext (IND-CCA2) security either rely on symmetric pairings or require long ciphertexts comprised of hundreds of group elements or do not provide publicly verifiable ciphertexts. We provide a publicly verifiable construction based on the SXDH assumption in asymmetric bilinear groups e : G ×Ĝ → GT , which features relatively short ciphertexts. For typical parameters, our ciphertext size amounts to less than 40 elements of G. As a second contribution, we provide a structure-preserving encryption scheme with perfectly randomizable ciphertexts and replayable chosen-ciphertext security. Our new RCCAsecure system significantly improves upon the best known system featuring similar properties in terms of ciphertext size.
Introduction
Structure-preserving cryptography is a paradigm where handled objects all live in discrete-log-hard abelian groups over which a bilinear map is efficiently computable. The structure-preserving property allows for a smooth interaction of the considered primitives with Groth-Sahai (GS) proof systems [36] , making them very powerful tools for the modular design of privacy-preserving cryptographic protocols [3, 8, 16, 17, 19, 27, 32, 37, 44, 51] .
In structure-preserving signatures (SPS) [6, 8] , messages, signatures, public keys all live in the source groups (G,Ĝ) of a bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T . The roots of SPS schemes can be traced back to the work of Groth [34] , which initiated a line of work seeking to obtain short signatures [4] [5] [6] 23, 40, 45] , security under standard assumptions [4, 18, 24, 37, 40, 45] , tight security proofs [5, 37] or lower the sender, which would be possible with publicly verifiable ciphertexts.
Abe et al. [5] provided several constructions of structure-preserving CCA2-secure encryption with publicly verifiable ciphertexts. On the downside, their solutions incur substantially longer ciphertexts than [16] : under the Decision Linear assumption, the most efficient solution of [5] entails 321 group elements per ciphertext. Moreover, it was only described in terms of symmetric pairings.
In addition, symmetric pairings have become significantly less efficient (see, e.g., [31] ) as the use of small-characteristic fields is now considered insecure [11] . This motivates the search for efficient structure-preserving CCA2-secure systems which provide shorter ciphertexts and can operate in asymmetric pairings.
Our Contributions. We provide a new CCA2-secure structure-preserving encryption scheme wherein the validity of ciphertexts is publicly verifiable and ciphertexts only consist of 16 elements of G and 11 elements ofĜ. By "public verifiability", we mean that ciphertexts which are rejected by the decryption algorithm should be recognizable given the public key. While stronger definitions of verifiability could be used 4 , this notions suffices to ensure confidentiality in settings -like threshold decryption [13, 46, 54] -where potentially harmful decryption queries should be publicly detectable. In particular, our first scheme readily implies a CCA2-secure structure-preserving cryptosystem that enables threshold decryption in the adaptive corruption setting.
In our first scheme, the ciphertext size amounts to 38 elements of G assuming that each element ofĜ has a representation which is twice as large as the representation of G elements. The security is proved under the standard symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption [53] in asymmetric bilinear maps.
As a second contribution, we provide a different structure-preserving cryptosystem which features perfectly re-randomizable ciphertexts and replayable chosen-ciphertext (RCCA) security. As defined by Canetti, Krawczyk and Nielsen [22] , RCCA security is a meaningful relaxation of CCA2 security that tolerates a "benign" form of malleability: namely, anyone should be able to randomize a given ciphertext into another encryption of the same plaintext. Under the SXDH assumption, our construction features statistically randomizable ciphertexts which only consist of 34 elements of G and 18 elements ofĜ. Under the same 5 assumption, the best known RCCA-secure realization thus far was the scheme of Chase et al. [25] which costs 49 elements of G and 20 elements ofĜ.
Our techniques. Our structure-preserving CCA2 secure cryptosystem builds on a public-key encryption scheme suggested by Libert and Yung [46] , which is not structure-preserving in its original form. Our starting observation is that, unlike Kiltz's tag-based encryption scheme [39] , the security proof of [46] does not require to interpret one-time signature verification keys as exponents. The construction of [46] is obtained by tweaking the Cramer-Shoup paradigm [26] and replacing the designated verifier NIZK proofs of ciphertext validity by a universally verifiable Groth-Sahai proof. In order to obtain publicly verifiable proofs with the desired security property called simulation-soundness [50] , the authors of [46] used Groth-Sahai common reference strings (CRSes) which depend on the verification key of a one-time signature. In the security proof, the key idea was to enable the simulation of fake NIZK proofs of ciphertext validity while making it impossible for the adversary to create such a fake proof himself. In Groth-Sahai proofs, this can be achieved by programming the Groth-Sahai CRSes in such a way that they form a linear subspace of dimension 1 in the challenge ciphertext whereas adversarially-generated ciphertexts involve CRSes of dimension 2 (which are perfectly sound CRSes).
We build on the observation that the approach of [46] still works if one-time verification keys consist of group elements instead of exponents. One difficulty is that we need one-time signature verification keys comprised of a single group element while the best known one-time SPS [6] have longer verification keys. Our solution is to "hash" the one-time verification keys of [6] in a structure-preserving manner. For this purpose, we apply a strictly structure-preserving commitment scheme proposed by Abe et al. [10] as if it was a chameleon hash function: namely, we replace the hash value by a commitment to the one-time verification key while the corresponding de-commitment information is included in the ciphertext. One caveat is that [10] considers a relaxed security notion for strictly structurepreserving commitments, called chosen-message target collision-resistance, which appears insufficient for our purposes. We actually need a stronger notion, called enhanced chosen-message target collision-resistance (ECM-TCR), where the adversary should also be able to come up with a different opening to the same message for a given commitment. Fortunately, we can prove that the strictly structure-preserving commitment of [10] does provide ECM-TCR security under the SXDH assumption.
The security proof of our construction addresses another technical hurdle which arises from the fact that ciphertexts contain elements from both sources groups G andĜ. Directly adapting the security proof of [46] would require to sign all elements of G andĜ that are contained in the ciphertext, which would require a one-time SPS where messages contain elements of both groups (G,Ĝ). While such schemes exist [4] , they are less efficient than one-time SPS schemes for unilateral messages. Our solution to this problem is to modify the security proof of Libert and Yung [46] in such a way that not all ciphertexts components have to be signed using the one-time signature. In short, we leverage the fact that only Groth-Sahai commitments have to live in the groupĜ: proof elements and other components of the ciphertext can indeed dwell in G. In GS commitments for linear multi-exponentiation equations, we notice that Groth-Sahai commitments are uniquely determined by the proof elements and the statement. For this reason, even if the adversary tampers with the GS commitments of the challenge ciphertext, it will be unable to create another ciphertext that will be accepted by the decryption oracle. This saves us from having to one-time-sign the Groth-Sahai commitments in the encryption algorithm, which is the reason why we only need such a system for unilateral messages.
Our construction of RCCA-secure encryption extends the ideas of Chase et al. [25] . In a nutshell, the RCCA-secure scheme of [25] combines a semantically secure encryption scheme and a randomizable witness indistinguishable proof of a statement of the form "Either I know the plaintext OR a signature of a ciphertext that this ciphertext is a randomization of". Our construction proceeds in an analogous way by demonstrating a statement of the form "Either I know the plaintext OR this ciphertext is a randomization of the challenge ciphertext".
In a high level, for the two branches of the statement we rely on proofs which nicely share a common structure to optimize our OR-proof. On the one hand, for the knowledge of the plaintext we use a quasi-adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) proof, which are NIZK proofs introduced by [38] where the CRS may depend on the specific language for which proofs have to be generated. Our QA-NIZK is built from the one-time structure-preserving linearly homomorphic signature (LHSPS) of Libert, Peters, Joye and Yung [42] . On the other hand, for the onetime signature we use the strongly unforgeable one-time SPS of Abe et al. [5] that we make re-randomizable thanks to LHSPS. These tools allows to combine some of the verification equations for which Groth-Sahai proofs of satisfiability are included in ciphertexts.
Related Work. Several different approaches [15, 30, 47, 48] were taken to reconcile chosen-ciphertext-security and homomorphism. Relaxed flavors of chosenciphertext security [22] opened the way to perfectly randomizable encryption schemes offering stronger guarantees than just semantic security. Groth described [33] a weakly RCCA secure variant of Cramer-Shoup which only encrypts messages in a bit-by-bit manner. Prabhakaran and Rosulek [47] showed how to more efficiently encrypt many bits at once in a RCCA-secure realization from the DDH assumption. While their solution features shorter ciphertexts than our RCCA-secure scheme, it is not structure-preserving as it cannot be readily instantiated in groups with a bilinear maps. On the other hand, unlike our scheme and the one of [25] , it allows re-randomizing ciphertexts without knowing under which public key they were encrypted.
Prabhakaran and Rosulek subsequently generalized the RCCA security notion [22] into a model [48] of homomorphic encryption that only supports a limited form of malleability. Boneh, Segev and Waters [15] took a different approach aiming for restricted malleability properties. Chase et al. [25] considered a modular design of HCCA-secure encryption [48] based on malleable proof systems. Their proposals turn out to be the only known HCCA/RCCA-secure structure-preserving candidates thus far.
Background and Definitions

Hardness Assumptions
We consider groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime-order p endowed with a bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T . In the asymmetric setting (G,Ĝ, G T ), we consider the SXDH assumption, which posits that the DDH assumption holds in both G andĜ.
Definition 2. The Double Pairing problem
It is known [8] that the DP assumption is implied by the DDH assumption in G. By exchanging the roles of G andĜ in the definition of DP, we obtain a variant of the assumption which implies the hardness of DDH inĜ.
One-Time Structure-Preserving Signatures
Structure-preserving signatures (SPS) [6, 8] are signature schemes where messages and public keys all consist of elements of a group over which a bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T is efficiently computable. Constructions based on simple assumptions were put forth in [4, 5] .
In the forthcoming sections, we will rely on one-time SPS schemes. Correctness mandates that, for any λ ∈ N, any PP ← Setup(λ), any pair (osk, ovk) ← KeyGen(PP), we have Verify(PP, ovk, M , Sign(PP, osk, M )) = 1 for any message M .
In addition, a one-time signature is said structure-preserving if the components of ovk, M and σ all live in the source groups (G,Ĝ) of a configuration (G,Ĝ, G T ) of bilinear groups. We recall a construction of the one-time Structure-Preserving Signature scheme which was proposed in [5] .
Setup(λ) : Choose asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p > 2 λ and output PP = (G,Ĝ, G T ). KeyGen(PP) : Generates the signing key osk and the verification key ovk using the security parameter λ and the number n of messages to be signed. 
Partial One-time Signature
A special case of the one-time signature presented in Section 2.2 is called Partial One-Time Signature (POTS) [12] . In a such scheme, part of the verification key can be re-used in multiple signatures and the remaining part must be refreshed at every signature generation. and returns 1 or 0.
Correctness requires that, for any PP ← Setup(λ), (sk, vk) ← KeyGen(PP) and (osk, ovk) ← OKeyGen(PP), the partial one-time signature scheme is correct if and only if Verify(PP, vk, ovk, M , Sign(PP, sk, osk, M )) = 1.
We focus on the strong unforgeability against one-time chosen-message attack of our POTS.
Definition 6.
A POTS scheme P OT S = (Setup, KeyGen, OKeyGen, Sign, Verify) is strongly unforgeable against one-time chosen-message attack (or OT-CMA secure) if:
is negligible for any PPT adversary A. Here, the signing oracle takes as input a message m, generates (ovk, osk) ← OKeyGen(PP), σ ← Sign(sk, osk, m). Then, it records (ovk, m) to Q and returns (σ, ovk).
Here, we recall an instantiation of the POTS scheme [4] , which is strongly unforgeable against the one-time chosen-message attack (SU-OTCMA) under the DP assumption.
Setup(λ, ) :
On input of a security parameter λ and an integer ∈ poly(λ), the setup algorithm chooses a large prime p > 2 λ , asymmetric groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p, with a bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T and the corresponding generators (g,ĝ) ∈ G ×Ĝ. The algorithm outputs 
otherwise the algorithm returns 0.
One-Time Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
Libert el. al. [42] considered structure-preserving with linear homomorphic properties (see the full version of the paper for formal definitions). This section recalls the one-time linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature (LHSPS) of [42] .
Keygen(λ, n): Given a security parameter λ and the dimension n ∈ N of the subspace to be signed, choose bilinear group (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p.
given pk as well as tuples (
Compute and return σ = (z, r), where
The one-time security of the scheme (of which the definition is recalled in the full version of the paper) was proved [42] under the DP assumption. In short, the security notion implies the infeasibility of deriving a signature on a vector outside the subspace spanned by the vectors authenticated by the signer. Here, "one-time" security means that a given public key allows signing only one subspace.
We remark that the one-time structure-preserving signature of Section 2.2 can be seen as a special case of the above LHSPS scheme, in which we fix the first element of the vector to be signed. The one-time security of this signature scheme can be directly deduced from the security of the LHSPS scheme.
Strictly Structure-Preserving (Trapdoor) Commitments
In this section, we recall the notion of Chosen-Message Target Collision Trapdoor Commitment as it was defined by Abe el. al. [10] . and outputs 1 or 0.
In trapdoor commitment schemes, the Setup algorithm additionally outputs a trapdoor tk which, on input of a message m and random coins r such that c = Com(PP, ck, m; r), allows opening the commitment c to any message m . In our construction, we need a length-reducing commitment scheme which satisfies a stronger notion of Chosen-Message Target Collision Resistance (CM-TCR) than the one considered in [10, Definition 10]. [10] and show that it actually satisfies our stronger notion of ECM-TCR security.
Definition 8. A Commitment Scheme provides enhanced chosen-message target collision-resistance (ECM-TCR) if the advantage
T C.Setup(λ, ) : On input of a security parameter λ and an integer ∈ poly(λ), the public parameters are generated by choosing a large prime p > 2 λ , asymmetric groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p, with a bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T and group generators (g,ĝ) ∈ G ×Ĝ. The algorithm outputs 
Output the commitmentĉom =Ĉ as well as the opening information
and open as in (1).
Using ovk pots = A ∈ G, return 1 if the following equalities hold:
Otherwise, return 0.
, it is possible to trapdoor-open a commitmentĉom =Ĉ in the same way as a Pedersen commitment sinceĈ is nothing but a Pedersen commitment to (sk pots , osk pots ).
We now prove that the above commitment does not only provide CM-TCR security as defined in [10] , but also ECM-TCR security. The proof builds on the same ideas as that of [10] but also takes advantage of the strong unforgeability 6 of the underlying partial one-time signature.
Theorem 1. The scheme provides ECM-CTR security under the SXDH assumption.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that a PPT adversary A can win the game of Definition 8 with noticeable probability. We observe that the adversary can only win in two mutually exclusive cases.
I. A outputs a commitmentĈ ∈Ĝ for which it provides an opening
Let us first assume that situation I occurs with noticeable probability. We show that A can be turned into an algorithm B I that breaks the DDH assumption inĜ by finding a pair (Z, R) such that e(Z,ĝ) · e(R,ĥ) = 1 G T for a given pair (ĝ,ĥ) ∈Ĝ 2 . This algorithm B I proceeds in the same way as in [10] . 
and the set Q must contain open
satisfies e(Z,ĝ) · e(R,ĥ) = 1 G T . Moreover, we have Z = 1 G with all but negligible probability since {ρ i } i=1 are completely independent of A's view.
We now turn to situation II and show that it implies an algorithm B II that defeats the strong unforgeability of the partial one-time signature scheme. Algorithm B II takes as input a POTS verification key 
A Structure-Preserving CCA2-Secure Public-Key Cryptosystem With Shorter Publicly Verifiable Ciphertexts
In this section, we use the all-but-one hash proof systems of [46] and combine them with the structure-preserving commitment scheme of Section 2.5 and a strongly unforgeable signature scheme. We show that the ECMTCR property of the commitment scheme suffices to construct the sought-after CCA2-secure structure preserving encryption scheme with publicly verifiable ciphertexts.
In the notations hereafter, for any vectorĥ = (ĥ 1 ,ĥ 2 ) ∈Ĝ 2 and any g ∈ G, we denote by E(g,ĥ) the vector (e(g,ĥ 1 ), e(g,ĥ 2 )). For any vectorsû 1 ,û 2 ∈Ĝ 2 , the productû 1 ·û 2 ∈Ĝ 2 refers to the component-wise multiplication inĜ.
KeyGen(λ): 1. Run the setup algorithm of the commitment scheme in Section 2.5 to obtain PP = (p, G,Ĝ, G T , e, g,ĝ, = 6) ← T C.Setup(λ, 6), which will be used to commit to messages inĜ 6 . 2. Generate (ck, tk) ← T C.KeyGen(PP), where ck ∈Ĝ 8 is the commitment key and tk ∈ Z 
3. Generate a commitment to SVK = (
,Â) and let
be the resulting commitment/opening pair. 
showing that the committed θ ∈ Z p satisfies the multi-exponentiation equations
where
Decrypt(PK, C, SK): Parse the ciphertext C as in (5). Then, conduct the following steps.
1. Parse PK as (g 1 , g 2 , X, PP, ck) and SK as (
Namely, it should satisfy
Note that, in step 3 of the decryption algorithm, the conditionĉom = 1Ĝ ensures that vectors (ûĉ om ,û 1 ) form a perfectly sound Groth-Sahai CRS, so that ciphertexts such that log g1 (C 1 ) = log g2 (C 2 ) are always rejected. The proof of the following theorem follows the strategy of [46] with additional arguments showing that omitting to sign the Groth-Sahai commitments does not affect the security of the scheme.
Theorem 2. The scheme provides IND-CCA2 security under the SXDH assumption. More precisely, Adv
Proof. The proof proceeds with a sequence of games that begins with the real game and ends with a game where no advantage is left to the adversary whatsoever. In each game, we call W i the event that the experiment outputs 1. The security parameter λ is implicitly given in all the games. Let q d denote the number of decryption queries made by the adversary.
Game 0: This is the real game. The adversary is given the public key PK which contains vectors (û 1 ,û 2 ) such that
whereĝ,ĥ
In the challenge phase, it chooses two messages M 0 , M 1 ∈ G and obtains a challenge ciphertext
where, for some random bit β R ← {0, 1},
as well as
, whereûĉ om =û 2 · (1,ĉom ). We assume w.l.o.g. that SVK andĉom =Ĉ are generated at the outset of the game. The adversary's decryption queries are always faithfully answered by the challenger. When the adversary halts, it outputs β ∈ {0, 1} and wins if β = β. In this case, the experiment outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. The adversary's advantage is thus | Pr[ 
Game 2: In this game, we modify the generation of the public key and definê
for a random ρ u R ← Z p , instead of computing (û 1 ,û 2 ) as in (7) . Note that (û 1 ,û 2 ) are now linearly independent andĉom is no longer statistically hidden before the challenge phase. However, a straightforward argument based on the semantic security of ElGamal (and thus the DDH assumption inĜ) shows that this modification does not affect the adversary's view. We (λ).
Game 4: We modify again the decryption oracle in post-challenge decryption queries. After the challenge phase, if the adversary A queries the decryption of a ciphertext 
Game 5: We introduce another modification in the decryption oracle. We reject all ciphertexts 
, relations (6) can be written Game 6: In this game, we modify the distribution of the public key. Namely, instead of generating the vectors (û 1 ,û 2 ) as in (8), we set
Said otherwise,û 2 is now the product of two terms, the first one of which lives in the one-dimensional subspace spanned byû 1 remains the only commitment that satisfies the verification equations for a given tuple (C 1 , C 2 , π 1 , π 2 ).
Game 7: In this game, we modify the challenge ciphertext and replace the NIZK proof π = (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ G 2 by a simulated proof which is produced using ρ u ∈ Z p as a simulation trapdoor. Namely, (Ĉ θ , π ) is obtained by picking r R ← Z p and computinĝ
Observe that, although (Ĉ θ , π 1 , π 2 ) are generated without using the witness θ = log g1 (C 1 ) = log g2 (C 2 ), the NIZK property of GS proofs ensures that their distribution remains exactly as in Game 6: indeed, if we definer = r − ρ u · θ , we havê
Game 8: We modify the generation of the challenge ciphertext, which is generated using the private key SK = (x 1 , x 2 ) instead of the public key: Namely, the challenger computes Game 9: We modify again the distribution of the challenge ciphertext which is obtained as
for random and independent θ 1 , θ 2 R ← Z p , while the NIZK proof (Ĉ θ , π 1 , π 2 ) is simulated using ρ u ∈ Z p as in Game 8. Since the witness θ ∈ Z p was not used anymore in Game 8, a straightforward reduction shows that any noticeable change in A's output distribution implies a DDH distinguisher in
In the final game, it is easy to see that Pr[W 9 ] = 1/2 since the challenge ciphertext does not carry any information about β ∈ {0, 1}. Indeed, we have
for some random θ 1 ∈ R Z p , which implies that the term g 2 θ 1 ·x2 perfectly hides M β in the expression of C 0 . This follows from the fact that x 2 ∈ Z p is perfectly independent of the adversary's view. Indeed, the public key leaves x 2 ∈ Z p completely undetermined as it only reveals X = g x1 1 g x2 2 . During the game, decryption queries are guaranteed not to reveal anything about x 2 since all NIZK proofs (Ĉ θ , π 1 , π 2 ) take place on Groth-Sahai CRSes (ûĉ om ,û 1 ) which are perfectly sound (as they span the entire vector spaceĜ 2 ) wheneverĉom =ĉom . This implies that, although the adversary can see a simulated NIZK proof (Ĉ θ , π 1 , π 2 ) for a false statement in the challenge phase, it remains unable to trick the decryption oracle into accepting a ciphertext C = (SVK,ĉom, open, C 0 , C 1 , C 2 ,Ĉ θ , π, σ) such that log g1 (C 1 ) = log g2 (C 2 ). As a consequence, the adversary does not learn anything about x 2 from responses of the decryption oracle.
Lemma 1. In Game 3, there exists an ECM-TCR adversary with advantage ≥ Pr[F 3 ] against the trapdoor commitment scheme of Section 2.5 and which runs in about the same time as A.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the SP-CCA encryption scheme as in the proof of Theorem 2 and let the event F 3 be defined as in Game 3. Then, we build an adversary B 3 against the ECM-CTR security of the structure-preserving trapdoor commitment defined in Section 2.5 which efficiently runs A.
The challenger B 3 is given the public parameter PP T C and a commitment key ck generated as in the trapdoor commitment scheme as well as an access to a commit-open oracle O ck as defined in Definition 8. Then, B 3 runs step 3 to step 6 of the key generation algorithm of the encryption scheme to get PK and SK = (x 1 , x 2 ) as specified in Game 2 and Game 3.
The adversary A is given PK and B 3 is easily able to answer to A's decryption queries as described in Game 2 and Game 3 thanks to SK. In order to compute the challenge ciphertext given {m 0 , m 1 (λ).
While we do not explicit provide a threshold decryption mechanism in the paper, this can be easily achieved in the same way as in the SXDH-based threshold cryptosystem described in [46] . As a result, we readily obtain a robust and non-interactive structure-preserving threshold cryptosystem with CCA2-security in the adaptive corruption setting.
It would be interesting to improve the efficiency of the scheme using quasiadaptive NIZK arguments [38] in the same way as in [43] . Unfortunately, we did not manage to obtain the required simulation-soundness property while keeping the QA-NIZK arguments structure-preserving.
A Randomizable RCCA-Secure Construction
Given a message M over G, the encryption algorithm computes an ElGamallike encryption of the form (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 
. In order to have an alternative decryption in the reduction as well as publicly verifiable ciphertexts, the algorithm then derives an LHSP signature (Section 2.4) on the vector
2 ), where b = 1 is a hidden bit. This is made possible by giving an LHSP signature on v 1 = (f, g, 1, 1, 1) and v 2 = (1, 1, 1, g, h) in the public key since v = v θ 1 . Note that, if b = 0, the encryption algorithm cannot derive a signature on v since (1, 1, g, c 1 , c 2 ) is outside the linear span of v 1 and v 2 . The goal of the security reduction is to compute the challenge ciphertext with b = 0 (using the signing key) and force the adversary to keep this b = 0 in any re-randomization of the challenge. This allows detecting when the adversary attempts to obtain the decryption of a replayed ciphertext.
In order to make freshly generated ciphertexts indistinguishable from (rerandomizations of) the challenge ciphertext, we use Groth-Sahai commitments and NIWI proofs to hide b. The encryption algorithm computes a commitment to g b and v and proves that b ∈ {0, 1} and that v is well-formed with respect to (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) . Then, it proves that the LHSP signature on v is valid.
This proof can be seen as a quasi-adaptive NIZK proof [38] that either (c 0 , c 1 , c 2 ) is well-formed or that I know a one-time signature on (c 1 , c 2 ) (of Section 2.2) which corresponds to an LHSP signature on (g, c 1 , c 2 ) , where g is the fixed element of the verification-key.
In order to statistically re-randomize ciphertext, the OR-proof should be efficiently and publicly adaptable and at the same time it should not support any other kind of malleability. Even though in the NIWI setting the Groth-Sahai proofs are perfectly re-randomizable the constants of the proofs are modified when we compute (c 0 , c 1 ,
θ as well as the variables
θ . Since proving that v has the correct form requires the same random coins as those used in the commitment of g b , the encryption algorithm simply adds in the ciphertext a commitment to v
2 , a proof of well-formedness and a Groth-Sahai NIWI proof of an LHSP signature that can be derived from the public key.
At a first glance, ciphertexts may appear not to prevent malleability of the encrypted message M since nothing seems to "freeze" c 2 in the ciphertext when c 1−b 2 = 1 in honest execution. However, the ciphertext actually binds c 2 in the proof elements which depend on the random coins of the commitments. 2. Choose random g, 1, 1, 1) and v 2 = (1, 1, 1, g, h) , then generate a crs for a QA-NIZK proof system for the language of vectors in span
and computeĝ j =ĝ χjĥγj , for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, as well as the language dependent parameters (
4. Define the private key as SK = α ∈ Z p and erase tk. The public key PK ∈ G 11 ×Ĝ 16 is defined to be
.
Encrypt(PK, M ):
To encrypt M ∈ G, conduct the following steps:
2. Define the bit b = 1 and set
Namely, compute commitments to G = g b (resp.ĝ b ), which are obtained
2 ×Ĝ 2 and π bit ∈ G 4 ×Ĝ 4 be the proof elements for relations (11) 
together with the Groth-Sahai commitments C z , C r ∈ G 2 of z, r ∈ G.
5. To enable re-randomization, define H = h b and F = f b and compute Groth-Sahai commitments to H and
6. Derive a QA-NIZK argument (z rand , r rand ) = (z
together with the commitments C z rand , C r rand ∈ G 2 .
Return the ciphertext c = (c 
while C z and C r are now commitments to
8 This is can be done efficiently because c contains the commitments and the proofs CG, πG ∈ π Enc and CH , πH , CF ∈ π Rand for which πG, πH should not only be associated to the bit b but should also contain the same random coins ofĈ b used in π1, π2. 9 At this point, {C i }i=0,1,2 are no longer commitments to {Θi}i=0,1,2 since the vari-
Return the ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , π Enc , π Rand ) where, We show that the above scheme, denoted by E, is statistically re-randomizable even for adversarially chosen ciphertexts, as defined in [47] (with the difference that the randomization algorithm uses the public key).
Decrypt(SK,
c
Theorem 3.
The above scheme E provides statistical unlinkability.
Proof. We only consider valid adversarially-generated ciphertext c since the validity of ciphertext is efficiently recognizable. Given c ← A(PK), we define two distributions on ciphertexts as in the definition of unlikability. The first distribution generates c ← Encrypt(PK, Decrypt(SK, c)) while the second distribution generates c ← ReRand(PK, c). Clearly if we write c = (c 1 , c 2 , π Enc , π Rand ), the first distribution generates (c 1 , c 2 ) as a fresh ElGamal ciphertext and the perfectly NIWI proofs (π Enc , π Rand ) are completely random subject to the verification of all the pairing product equations detailed in the encryption algorithm of E. Indeed, the key generation algorithm sets the CRSes (u 1 , u 2 ) and (û 1 ,û 2 ) as random elements as in the perfect NIWI setting of the Groth-Sahai proof system [36] . For the same reason, ReRand transforms c into a perfectly re-randomized ciphertext c . Indeed, step 1 leads to a perfectly re-randomized ElGamal ciphertext (c 1 , c 2 
θ . Steps 2 and 3 adapt the GrothSahai commitments and proofs with respect to the constant (c 1 , c 2 ) to keep the validity of the ciphertext. Finally, step 4 completely re-randomizes these commitments and proofs and the NIWI setting ensures that the resulting (π Enc , π Rand ) are uniformly re-distributed among all the valid proofs satisfying the same pairing product equations with the constant (c 1 , c 2 ) . Consequently, c is distributed as a fresh ciphertext of Decrypt(SK, c) even if the adversary tried to put some subliminal information in c.
Next, we show that E is secure against a Replayable Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (RCCA) in the sense of [22] .
Theorem 4.
The above scheme E provides RCCA security under the SXDH assumption. More precisely, we have Adv
Proof. The proof uses a sequence of games starting with the real game and ending with a game where even an unbounded adversary has no advantage. For each i, S i is the event that the challenger outputs 1 in Game i meaning that the adversary rightly guesses which message is encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. We assume that security parameter λ is given in each game.
Game 1: This is the real attack game where the adversary chooses M 0 and M 1 and obtains a challenge ciphertext c as a real encryption of M β , for some β R ← {0, 1} chosen by the challenger, in the challenge phase. We recall that the adversary may query the decryption of any ciphertext. In the post-challenge phase, when the challenger uses SK to faithfully reply to the decryption queries it runs the decryption algorithm and returns ⊥ if the (public) verification fails. If the decryption returns M , the challenger sends back M except if M ∈ {M 0 , M 1 }, in which case "replay" is returned. We denote by S 1 the event that the adversary outputs β = β, which causes the challenger to output 1.
Game 2:
This game is like Game 1 except that, in the challenge phase, the challenge ciphertext c = (c 1 , c 2 , π Enc , π Rand ), the proofs
are obtained by computing π Enc , π Rand as simulated proofs using the trapdoor
. This is achieved by computing (z,r) ∈ G 2 as a linearly homomoprhic signature on the vector v = (1 G , 1 G , g, c 1 , c 2 ) . In step 2 of the encryption algorithm, the challenger thus sets b = 0, and conducts the remaining steps of the encryption algorithm except for (z,r) at step 4. Thanks to the perfect witness indistinguishability of Groth-Sahai proofs (recall that (u 1 , u 2 ) and (û 1 ,û 2 ) form CRSes for the perfect NIWI setting in the real game), the NIWI proofs π Enc , π Rand have exactly the same distribution as in Game 1 and A's view remains unchanged. We have Pr[S 2 ] = Pr[S 1 ]. Note that tk is also used to generate the LHSP signatures on the vectors v 1 , v 2 of the public key.
Game 3:
In this game, we modify the distribution of the public key. In step 2 of the key generation algorithm, we choose 
Game 4:
We modify the decryption oracle. When the adversary A queries the decryption of c = (c 1 , c 2 , π Enc , π Rand ), the challenger parses the proofs as
and rejects c if the proofs do not properly verify. Otherwise, instead of merely using the private key SK = α to compute M = c 1 /c α 2 as in the real decryption algorithm, the challenger B uses the extraction trapdoor β = log u1,1 (u 1,2 ) of the Groth-Sahai CRS (u 1 , u 2 ), where u 1 = (u 1,1 , u 1,2 ) , to extract the witnesses g b , (z, r) and
which are contained in π Enc .
Then, the challenger uses tk
and rejects the ciphertext in the event that z † = z. If c is not rejected,
If M ∈ {M 0 , M 1 } in the post-challenge phase, B returns "replay" as in the actual RCCA game. Otherwise, it returns M to A. It is easy to see that, if B rejects a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 3, then B is able to solve the DP problem. This is because (u 1 , u 2 ) and (û 1 ,û 2 ) are perfectly sound Groth-Sahai CRSes and the validity of the proof π enc implies that (z, r) would be another valid homomorphic signature on v ∈ G 5 than the one that B can compute. Therefore, this would provide B with two distinct linearly homomorphic signatures on the same vector and allow B to solve an instance of the DP problem as done in the proof of [ Before the challenge: It is easy to see that the probability to reject a ciphertext that would not have been rejected in Game 4 is statistically negligible. This follows from the fact that, from the public key, A has only obtained linearly homomorphic signatures on (v 1 , v 2 ), the span of which clearly does not contain v = (Θ 0 , Θ 1 , g/g b , C 1 /Θ 1 , C 2 /Θ 2 ) when g/g b = 1 G . Therefore, pre-challenge decryption queries for which g b = 1 are rejected in Game 4 except in the event that z † = z. This event only occurs with probability at most 1/p at each such query since z † (as computed from v using tk) is completely unpredictable from the public key. This follows from the fact that honestly-generated LHSP signatures are deterministic functions of tk while there exist exponentially many valid signatures on each vector of messages. The signing key tk retains sufficient entropy to make it statistically impossible to predict the honestly-generated signature on a vector outside the span of (v 1 , v 2 ), which are given in PK.
After the challenge: First, the perfect soundness of the Groth-Sahai proofs {π i } 2 ). The difference with pre-challenge queries is that the adversary is also given information on the signature on v from the challenge ciphertext c . Hence, in post-challenge queries, LHSP signatures must be in span v 1 , v 2 , v . Secondly, we consider the two cases b ∈ {0, 1}:
-If g b = 1 G (i.e., b = 0), we have v = (Θ 0 , 1 G , g, c 1 , c 2 ) . Since c was not rejected, the vector v must be in span v 2 , (1 G , 1 G , g, c 1 , c 2 ) (i.e. without v 1 because the second component of v is 1 G ) except with probability 1/p. Indeed, otherwise, the same argument as in Game 4 shows that c can only avoid rejection if it contains a commitment C z to z † = z and we argued that it is statistically independent of A's view for vectors outside span v 1 , v 2 , (1 G , 1 G , g, c 1 , c 2 ) . This means that v = v 0 · v In Game 6, no information about β ∈ {0, 1} is leaked anywhere, so that we get Pr[S 6 ] = 1/2. Since the SXDH assumption implies the DP assumption, we thus find the following advantage
which concludes the proof.
